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The practices and opinions of experienced civil rights  
and employment discrimination attorneys
By Hosch Professor Thomas A. Eaton and Mercer University School of Law’s George Professor Harold S. Lewis Jr. 
Editor’s Note:  This is an abridged version of an article that will be published in a forthcoming issue of Federal Rules Decisions.
Rule 68 Offers of Judgment:
s structured 
by Rule 68 of 
the Federal 
Rules of 
Civil Procedure, offers 
of judgment are intend-
ed to encourage settle-
ment but are widely 
thought to be ineffective in doing so. The 
primary explanation for this impotence is 
that Rule 68 does not provide enough of 
a carrot or stick to move the parties to the 
prompt resolution of their dispute. 
In broad terms, offers of judgment impose 
a price on one party’s refusal to accept a rea-
sonable offer. Under the text of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 68, that price is a forfei-
ture of the relatively modest “costs” described 
by 28 U.S.C. § 19201 that would otherwise 
be recoverable by a prevailing party, as well as 
payment of the defendant’s post-offer costs 
of the same kind. 
Significantly, the costs put in play by the 
bare text of Rule 68 do not include attorneys’ 
fees and in most cases will even in the aggre-
gate be so modest that they will not create 
a significant incentive for a defendant to 
make, or a plaintiff to be fearful of rejecting, 
an offer of judgment. 
In light of the weak incentives, it is not 
surprising that Rule 68 has played only a 
minor role in federal civil litigation since its 
enactment in 1937. 
There are, however, certain classes of 
claims in which Rule 68 has the potential to 
be a much greater influence on dispute reso-
lution – claims under statutes that include 
attorneys’ fees as part of recoverable costs. 
In its 1985 opinion in Marek v. Chesny2, 
the Supreme Court melded the Rule 68 
term “costs” with the phrase “fees as part of 
the costs” that appears in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 
which codifies the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976. That statute autho-
rizes awards of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs who 
prevail in claims brought under certain civil 
rights statutes, as well as to the rare prevailing 
defendant that can demonstrate a plaintiff ’s 
claim was frivolous or without foundation. 
Under Marek, a plaintiff who rejects a 
Rule 68 offer and prevails at trial for an 
amount not exceeding the offer forfeits not 
only the modest costs discussed above but 
also all post-offer attorneys’ fees that a pre-
vailing civil rights plaintiff would otherwise 
receive by virtue of a federal statute. 
While a significant number of federal fee-
shifting statutes do not employ the “fees as 
part of costs” language upon which Marek 
relied, the great bulk of contemporary fed-
eral question litigation is founded on statutes 
that do award fees as part of costs. 
Notably, this latter group includes litiga-
tion under most civil rights legislation,3 Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 and 
a significant number of envi-
ronmental statutes.
At the time 
Marek was decided, many commentators 
feared Rule 68 would give civil rights defen-
dants so much leverage that Rule 68 offers 
would effectively coerce premature and 
unfair settlements. 
Specifically, it was speculated that defen-
dants would routinely make early, low-ball 
offers of judgment; plaintiffs, fearful of for-
feiting what is often the largest part of their 
recovery (attorneys’ fees), would feel com-
pelled to accept many such offers without 
having had the opportunity to conduct 
sufficient discovery to evaluate with care 
the probability and magnitude of success; 
and the federal policies underlying these 
fee-authorization statutes would be seriously 
undermined as a result.  
For the most part, however, it appears 
that these concerns did not materialize. In 
the two decades following Marek, 
there have been only occasional 
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reported decisions construing Rule 68. 
In addition, anecdotal reports from both 
plaintiff and defense counsels whose prac-
tices are devoted to employment discrimina-
tion and civil rights confirm the rarity of 
Rule 68 offers.  
Despite the widespread belief that Rule 68 
has had little practical effect on civil litiga-
tion, there is a resurgence of interest in offers 
of judgment. States, including Georgia, have 
enacted new offers of judgment statutes, or 
modified existing ones, as part of civil litiga-
tion reform efforts.5 
Academic literature abounds with doctri-
nal, theoretical, experimental and empiri-
cal scholarship that explores how offers of 
judgment statutes might be more effective 
in achieving the goal of bringing about the 
faster, less costly resolution of federal civil 
litigation without undue sacrifice of fairness 
to parties.
We were interested in learning why Rule 
68 is not a more prominent feature of civil 
rights and employment discrimination litiga-
tion. Why is it not used more frequently in 
the very types of cases in which defendants 
have the greatest economic incentive 
to make offers and plaintiffs have 
the most to lose if they refuse 
them? 
Our interest in Rule 68 
is not driven by the 
belief that 
too many cases go to trial. Indeed, it appears 
the civil trial has become a notable rarity 
– by one respected account, more than 98 
percent of federal civil litigation is resolved 
by means other than trials.6 
Nevertheless, Rule 68 may harbor the 
potential to speed up the settlement process 
and thereby produce significant economic 
savings to the parties, with correlative sav-
ings to the courts and the taxpayers who 
fund them. 
Our contribution to the policy discus-
sion is to report the views of experienced 
practicing attorneys who decide on a daily 
basis whether to make or accept offers of 
judgment. 
We conducted in-person, in-depth inter-
views with 64 experienced litigators who 
prosecute and defend civil rights and employ-
ment discrimination claims. This is the first 
such nationwide empirical inquiry into the 
incidence of practitioner use of Rule 68 in 
the federal fee-authorization cases where, 
after Marek, one would expect its use to be 
most common. 
We interviewed cohorts of four 
attorneys in each of 16 
cities. Each 
cohort consisted of attorneys who represent 
civil rights plaintiffs, civil rights defendants, 
employment discrimination plaintiffs and 
employment discrimination defendants. 
Collectively the 64 lawyers we interviewed 
had more than 1,600 years of practice expe-
rience. The least experienced attorney we 
interviewed had been practicing in the area 
for 10 years; the most senior lawyer had been 
in practice for more than 40 years; and the 
average level of experience in our pool was 
more than 25 years. Our 64 lawyers col-
lectively had worked on more than 13,000 
employment discrimination or civil rights 
cases during the last five years. Assured 
of confidentiality, they were also extremely 
candid, occasionally even confessing matters 
that reflected less than nobly on their com-
petence or professionalism. 
With some exception, Rule 68 
offers are rarely made in federal 
civil rights and employment dis-
crimination cases
The first research question we explored 
was whether the anecdotes were true: is Rule 
68 largely ignored? Our interviews con-
firmed that in federal districts throughout 
the United States, Rule 68 offers of judg-
ment are rarely used in either employment 
discrimination or civil rights cases.
A New York City employment discrimi-
nation plaintiff attorney who had been in 
practice for 33 years reported he had received 
three offers in his practice experience – one 
every 11 years. 
An employment discrimination 
defense lawyer in New Orleans said 
he had made 10-15 offers in 30 
years of practice. That works 
out to one offer made every 
two or three years. 
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A Chicago employment defense lawyer 
said he had not made any Rule 68 offers in 
the past five years. 
An in-house corporate counsel, who 
supervises employment discrimination cases 
for one Fortune 500 company, said his client 
had not made an offer of judgment during 
the past decade.
On the civil rights side, one 
defense lawyer stated he had 
made no more than 10 offers 
over a 30-year career in which 
he and his firm have processed 
10,000 cases on behalf of the 
state’s largest city and various 
sheriff ’s departments. 
Civil rights defense attor-
neys in Memphis and 
Houston, who between them 
had more than 40 years of 
experience, had never made a 
Rule 68 offer. 
These stories tend to con-
firm the conventional wisdom 
regarding the infrequent use 
of Rule 68.
While the general rule is 
one of non-use or very infre-
quent use, there were some 
notable exceptions. 
Civil rights defense lawyers 
in New York City, Minneapolis, 
Philadelphia, Oakland and 
the greater Seattle area report 
they now consider whether 
to make a Rule 68 offer as 
a routine part of initial case 
evaluations. 
A civil rights defense lawyer in the Pacific 
Northwest reported he has made Rule 68 
offers in 70 percent of his cases. No one 
else we interviewed came even close to that 
figure. 
All the reports of systematic use of Rule 
68 came from lawyers practicing civil rights 
defense, not employment discrimination 
defense. Thus, the lawyers reporting the 
greatest use of Rule 68 all represented public 
– not private – defendants. 
Even in cities in which civil rights defen-
dants make Rule 68 offers with some fre-
quency, we found no evidence of similar use 
of Rule 68 in employment discrimination 
cases, where most defendants are private 
companies.
Why aren’t more Rule 68 offers 
of judgment made in civil rights 
and employment discrimination 
cases?
There is no single answer to this question. 
However, several themes recurred through-
out the interviews. A few of the more promi-
nent themes include the following:
1. Problems with the term “judgment”
The most frequently voiced explanation 
for why Rule 68 is not used more often is that 
there are problems associated with the word 
“judgment.” 
Privately negotiated settlements typically 
include non-admission of liability clauses and 
confidentiality provisions. Judgments are more 
formal public declarations of wrongdoing. 
Many defense lawyers reported their cli-
ents, both public and private, want to avoid 
making this formal declaration of wrongdo-
ing.
Some defense counsels explained their 
clients would not want to make a public 
declaration of wrongdoing because doing so 
might encourage others to sue. 
Other lawyers reported their clients were 
concerned about adverse publicity. 
Some lawyers were concerned about more 
specific adverse consequences. For example, 
we were told by several civil rights defense 
lawyers that a police officer who has a judg-
ment entered against him individually would 
have more difficulty securing a mortgage and 
face difficulties in career advancement.
Lawyers for public defen-
dants, and to a lesser extent 
private defendants, also 
expressed a need to back up 
their team: “we’re not going 
to make offers of judgment 
because it makes it look like 
we’re not backing our police 
officers,” or “we need to sup-
port the police” or “we need 
to support the supervisors in 
our company, especially when 
we do not think that they did 
anything wrong.” 
The term “judgment” was 
viewed by many attorneys as 
an admission that the alleged 
wrongdoing had occurred, 
while a “settlement” could be 
explained on grounds other 
than the merits.  
2.  Why make a Rule 68 
offer when we are con-
fident that we will ulti-
mately win the case?
Many defense coun-
sels explained they do not 
make frequent use of Rule 
68 because they are confident 
they will prevail on the merits, often at the 
summary judgment stage. 
On its face, Rule 68 triggers a sanction 
only when the plaintiff receives a judgment 
for less than the amount of the offer. Thus, 
it provides no specific tangible reward to a 
defendant for having made an offer if the 
defendant then wins the case outright on 
the merits.7 
Interestingly, some employment discrimi-
nation defense lawyers who do not make 
Rule 68 offers in federal court said they do 
make offers under corresponding state rules 
where the state rules allow their clients to 
recover attorneys’ fees from the plaintiff. 
Thus, there appears to be some merit to 
the proposition that if court rules hold out 
to defendants the prospect of not just relief 
The most frequently voiced explanation 
for why Rule 68  
is not used more often  
is that there are problems associated with 
the word “judgment.”  
… Judgments are more formal public  
declarations of wrongdoing.
– Hosch Professor Tom Eaton and  
George Professor Harold Lewis
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from paying a plaintiff ’s fees, but an affirma-
tive award for their own fees, they might 
make more Rule 68 offers. 
3. “Not a penny for tribute”
The reluctance to make a Rule 68 offer 
may be part of a broader, hardball litigation 
strategy. 
Several defense lawyers commented their 
clients would rather pay thousands for 
defense and “not a penny for tribute.” This 
suggests that clients would rather pay more 
money litigating than it would take to 
resolve the dispute under Rule 68. 
Why would that be so? Discouraging 
the filing of other claims, avoiding adverse 
publicity, and supporting government and 
corporate officials whose actions are being 
challenged may all play a part. 
One civil rights defense lawyer expressed 
the “not a penny for tribute” sentiment in 
terms of morality, saying that it was “just 
wrong” to spend a dollar of taxpayer money 
to pay a non-legally deserving plaintiff. That, 
in his view, is a misuse of public funds. 
Of course a defendant adopting this stance 
may be just as averse to a privately negotiated 
settlement as to a resolution under Rule 68.
4. Economic conflict of interests
The fourth common theme is the specter 
of economic conflict between the defendant 
and defense counsel. 
Since the primary leverage Rule 68 pro-
vides is the forfeiture of plaintiffs’ post-offer 
attorneys’ fees, the offer is more effective if 
made early in the litigation. 
If a Rule 68 offer is made closer to trial 
(e.g., after the denial of a defense motion for 
summary judgment), a lesser amount of the 
plaintiff ’s attorneys’ fees is at risk after the 
offer is rejected. 
Most defense lawyers are paid on the basis 
of an hourly fee. There is a widespread suspi-
cion among plaintiff lawyers that one reason 
more Rule 68 offers are not made early in 
the litigation is that defense lawyers wish 
to accrue a certain amount of fees before 
encouraging their clients to settle. 
Most but not all of the plaintiff lawyers we 
interviewed subscribed to the belief that eco-
nomic conflict between defendants and their 
lawyers partially accounts for the apparent 
underutilization of Rule 68. 
Of course, no defense lawyer admitted to 
running up his own fees, but some acknowl-
edged that there might be others who do. 
Other defense lawyers expressed strong 
disagreement, even outrage, at this sugges-
tion. They pointed out that market forces 
push them towards efficient resolution of 
disputes. Competition among the defense 
bar for clients is such that a lawyer who pads 
his hours will soon find his client represented 
by another attorney. 
And even in single engagement cases 
where counsel does not expect to represent 
the client in future matters, there is often an 
insurance company that is paying the cost 
of defense. 
The economic conflict theory is also called 
into question by the fact that many salaried 
government attorneys who do not stand to 
gain financially by increasing the number 
of hours devoted to resolving a dispute, 
nevertheless, also fail to recommend Rule 
68 offers.
On the other hand, the only lawyers we 
found who did make Rule 68 offers with any 
degree of frequency were those representing 
public defendants. And they did so despite 
the bureaucratic obstacles of gaining settle-
ment authority reported by some of those 
lawyers. 
To some extent this finding may support 
the assumption that there is economic con-
flict between private, hourly paid defense 
lawyers and their clients.
5.  Problems with placing a value on a 
claim early in the litigation
A few defense lawyers said they cannot 
accurately evaluate a case sufficiently early in 
the litigation to make Rule 68 an attractive 
inducement to resolve the dispute. 
One defense lawyer claimed he needed 18 
months of discovery before he could ethi-
cally evaluate what a case was worth. 
This problem is compounded by defense 
uncertainty regarding the amount of plain-
tiff pre-offer attorneys’ fees. 
The current Rule makes the amount of 
those fees critical to calculating whether a 
plaintiff ’s ultimate judgment exceeds the 
defendant’s offer, yet it does not require a 
plaintiff to disclose those fees to facilitate 
fully informed offers. 
Very few of our interviewees deemed 
ordinary case valuation to be a significant 
problem. 
Plaintiff and defense lawyers in both civil 
rights and employment discrimination prac-
tices overwhelmingly agreed a defense lawyer 
can value a case in terms of liability and 
damages fairly early on in the litigation 
– generally within four to six months after 
the action commences. 
Further, most defense lawyers thought 
they could either estimate the plaintiff ’s pre-
offer fees by considering what the defense 
fees were at that point in the case; or by 
evaluating how well they thought the plain-
tiff was prepared at that stage; or simply by 
asking the plaintiff ’s counsel directly for this 
information. 
However, several defense lawyers expressed 
the view that plaintiffs’ fees often do not 
correspond to defense fees and that plaintiff 
counsels generally refuse to provide this 
information when requested.
Attorneys’ reactions to reform 
proposals
Soften terminology from “judgment” to 
“settlement/agreement”
The first proposal was simply a terminol-
ogy change. Instead of an offer of “judg-
ment,” amend the Rule 68 to authorize 
an offer of “settlement” or “agreement” or 
“compromise,” the language used in rules in 
several states. 
In a similar vein, we inquired about hav-
ing the Rule expressly authorize the defen-
dant to include in the offer a nonadmission 
of liability clause, which some of our law-
yers considered logically inconsistent with a 
“judgment.”
There was almost universal support among 
our plaintiff and defense lawyer respondents 
for softening the Rule’s terminology from 
offer of “judgment” to offer of “settlement” 
or “agreement.” 
All who expressed a view on the issue 
agreed the change had the potential to 
increase defendants’ use of the Rule. 
A small number of plaintiff lawyers 
opposed altering the terminology fearing 
that an increased use of Rule 68 would do 
their clients more harm (e.g., low-ball offers 
that might coerce early resolution) than good 
(earlier payment of a reasonable sum). 
Others expressed concern that the term 
“settlement” undermined the public vindica-
tion of the plaintiff and condemnation of the 
defendant implicit in the latter’s confession 
of a “judgment.” 
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Fundamentally reformulating the Rule 
to be two-way, so plaintiffs as well as 
defendants could initiate the offer pro-
cess
Although several states, including Georgia, 
empower plaintiffs to make Rule 68 offers, 
the current Federal Rule allows only defen-
dants to do so. 
Initially we asked the lawyers about their 
general attitude, without getting into the 
details, about allowing plaintiffs, as well as 
defendants, to initiate the offer. 
That is, for the first time, federal court 
plaintiffs would have the option of submit-
ting an offer (really, a demand) of judgment 
or settlement that would put defendants at 
risk for some sanction, probably a fee mul-
tiplier, beyond the damages and fee liability 
defendants currently incur if they are found 
liable in an action under a federal fee-recov-
ery statute.
Plaintiff counsels overwhelmingly and 
strongly supported this change. 
If the Rule were made two-way, they said, 
plaintiffs would use it early and routinely as a 
way of dynamiting earlier offers out of recal-
citrant defendants, particularly those whose 
liability was backed by an insurer. 
Plaintiff counsels further speculated that 
defendants would likely respond with their 
own early counter-offers of judgment. 
Plaintiff lawyers also asserted that a plain-
tiff ’s offer (demand) followed by a defen-
dant’s offer would establish a more reason-
able range for settlement at an earlier time 
in the litigation than in ordinary settlement 
negotiations. 
This assertion was premised on the belief 
that Rule 68 offers are of potential value to 
offerors only if they represent predictions of 
trial outcomes that are credible to offerees.
Many defense counsels were strongly 
opposed to empowering plaintiffs to make a 
Rule 68 offer, although a significant number 
were either moderately or strongly support-
ive. We should not, however, underestimate 
the intensity of the opposition on the part of 
many defense lawyers. 
In general, they reasoned that defendants 
who lost at trial were already liable to pay 
100 percent of the plaintiffs’ fees and that 
any additional sanction was excessive. Or 
they pointed out that defendants who make 
offers and plaintiffs who make demands 
are not similarly situated, in that offers are 
underwritten by a defendant’s real resources 
while demands cost plaintiffs nothing. 
A summary of attorneys’ reactions to 
two-way reform proposals
We presented the attorneys with a number 
of specific proposals. 
These had two primary variables: the sanc-
tion imposed on the party rejecting the Rule 
68 offer and defining when the sanction 
would be triggered. 
Determining the appropriate sanction is 
quite tricky. 
Clearly, the current Rule 68 sanctions 
do not induce civil rights and employment 
discrimination defendants to make many 
Rule 68 offers. 
What sort of additional sanctions might 
prompt defendants to make more Rule 68 
offers (e.g., requiring plaintiffs who did not 
improve on the offer at trial to pay some 
multiple of defendants’ costs or even defen-
dants’ post-offer attorneys’ fees)? 
On the other hand, given that civil rights 
and employment discrimination plaintiffs 
who prevail at trial already are awarded attor-
neys’ fees, what additional sanction might be 
awarded to a plaintiff when a defendant who 
rejects the plaintiff ’s Rule 68 offer and does 
not improve on the offer at trial (e.g., an 
enhancement of attorneys’ fees)? And what 
circumstances would trigger these sanctions? 
One set of proposals suggested creating 
additional “pressure” by requiring the offeree 
to beat the offer by a certain percentage 
(say, 15 or 25 percent) to avoid a sanction. 
Other proposals incorporated a “cushion” by 
denying sanctions if the outcome at trial fell 
within some specified percentage of the offer 
(again, say, 15 or 25 percent).
None of the specific proposals received 
uniform support. 
Yet opposition to particular proposals may 
have obscured somewhat greater support by 
both plaintiff and defense lawyers for the gen-
eral concept of some kind of two-way rule. 
More than a few lawyers who objected 
to specific details of a proposed model nev-
ertheless embraced the broad suppositions 
underlying a two-way Rule 68.
These suppositions are that defense law-
yers who might not now counsel their clients 
to consider the Rule would routinely and 
quickly do so if their clients were to receive a 
plaintiff ’s offer of judgment (demand) under 
a two-way regime. 
There would then be two offers (really an 
offer and a demand) on the table. If each 
was made thoughtfully, those offers might 
be pegged at a somewhat more realistic 
level than the customarily extreme initial 
demands and responses in standard posi-
tional bargaining. 
This is because the benefits under the Rule 
for a plaintiff offeror would not be triggered 
unless she could beat her own offer after trial 
by at least a penny, or perhaps by a modest 
percentage; and the benefits for a defendant 
offeror would not be triggered if the plaintiff 
could exceed or come close to that offer 
within the same margins. 
Further, those somewhat more realistic 
demands and offers would presumably be 
made earlier than the opening salvos in ordi-
nary private settlement negotiations. 
Unlike the defendant, who has sole control 
over initiation of Rule 68 today, the plaintiff 
and plaintiff ’s lawyer are typically desirous of 
resolving litigation and being compensated 
as soon as possible. They, therefore, have 
every incentive to consider making a Rule 
68 offer quickly. 
Finally, the Rule’s 10-day deadline for 
acceptance or rejection of an offer/demand, 
often 30 days in state practice, might result 
in both sides focusing on settlement and, 
mindful of probable trial outcomes, doing so 
earlier than in ordinary bargaining uninflu-
enced by the Rule. 
Several respondents offered an opinion 
about whether this “realism” dynamic is 
implicit in a two-way rule and would speed 
the pace of settlements. 
Civil rights plaintiff lawyers told us, at 
least in theory, a two-way rule would lead to 
earlier resolutions and would not have any 
more negative effects on their clients than 
the current Rule. 
Civil rights defense lawyers responded 
more diversely on the general utility of a 
two-way rule. Some opined it would not 
have much effect because plaintiffs’ typical 
demands are (and implicitly would remain) 
outrageous. 
Others agreed that a two-way approach 
would elicit early, more reasonable plaintiff 
demands and would encourage earlier reso-
lution of conflicts by providing pressure well 
before trial is imminent.
The most widespread enthusiasm for a 
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two-way rule was found among our plaintiff 
employment discrimination lawyers. 
The degree of support for a two-way rule 
among those lawyers was somewhat surpris-
ing given the view held by many that the 
threat of increased costs sanctions on their 
clients might well deter the initiation or con-
tinued prosecution of viable claims. 
Few employment discrimination defense 
counsels – the lawyer group probably most 
threatened economically by the successful 
use of the Rule – opined on a two-way rule, 
but most who did were, perhaps surpris-
ingly, somewhat supportive, at least in the 
abstract.  
Dilemmas for the  
amendment process 
History suggests that would-be reformers 
of Rule 68 should approach the task with 
considerable caution. 
Prior efforts to modify Federal Rule 68 
have failed, and the prospects for success 
depend importantly on securing a con-
sensus from both sides of 
the bar. 
The core challenge is 
to devise a set of sanc-
tions, triggered under 
circumstances, that both sides view as suf-
ficient to induce the parties to make early 
offers, but not so great as to unfairly coerce 
parties to forego their legitimate rights to 
pursue and defend civil rights and employ-
ment discrimination claims. 
Striking this balance in a way that both 
plaintiff and defense attorneys deem palat-
able should prove to be quite difficult. 
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